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          CHAPTER I 
         INTRODUCTION 
 
      1.1 Masquerade Detection 
 
 A computer system masquerader is an intruder who takes over a genuine user 
session and misuses it. Masqueraders occupy a privileged user’s seat and exploit their 
privileges to access secure programs and data. Session take over by a masquerader can be 
due to careless behavior of the legitimate user, who mindlessly skips either to lock the 
system or to logout temporarily before going on a break. Such a careless act by the proper 
user creates an opportunity for hackers to misuse secure computer systems. Masqueraders 
typically look for secure files, software and privileges that they cannot use. A well-
known instance of masquerader activity is the case of Robert. P. Hanssen, the FBI mole 
who allegedly used agency computers to ferret out information later sold to his 
conspirators [11]. Hanssen was an insider who abused his privileges to make money.
 Masquerade detection software is therefore essential for secure systems as in 
defense and banking which contain highly confidential information that must be shielded 
against hackers, especially masqueraders. Masquerade detection is a challenging 
problem, which people have been trying to solve since 1988. Numerous attempts targeted 
at building masquerade detection systems have resulted in failure. User profiles were 
constructed from system-log data, which contained information such as time of login, 
physical location of login, duration of user session, cumulative CPU time, commands 
issued, programs executed, names of files accessed and so forth [9] [3]. This log 
information was used as training data to build user profiles. If a deviation was noted 
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while testing new data for a user with his already existing user profile, a masquerade 
attempt was reported. 
 
   1.2 Simulating a Masquerade Detection System  
     
 One of the major challenges facing Masquerade detection systems is real-time 
detection.  A real-time Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to detect masquerades would 
analyze a user’s log file with various fields like commands, time of login, location of 
login, to name a few. Simulating or implementing real-time IDS is a huge task and 
requires a detailed study of many components. Even if such a huge system is simulated or 
implemented, there would still be false alarms if the data were noisy. Hence, researchers 
started focusing on the components of IDS to perform analysis and reduce false alarms as 
much as possible. 
 Schonlau et al. [14] analyzed user log files that contained truncated UNIX 
commands for 70 users. They proposed four statistical and two machine-learning 
techniques to analyze users command log files. The best result they reported had 70% hit 
rate and 6.7% false alarm rate. Maxion and Townsend [12] later proposed a Naïve Bayes 
text classification analysis on Schonlau’s data and recorded a hit rate of 61% for a false 
alarm rate of 1.3%. Finally, Yung [18] proposed a Self-Consistent Naïve Bayes technique 
that lowered the missing alarm rate by 40% for a false alarm rate of 1.3%. Yung’s model 
classified the test sessions offline, in other words, the test sessions were classified only 
after the final test session arrives. He justified that offline classification has very low 
missing alarms, which was the main purpose of Masquerade detection system. It is better 
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to classify a session as masquerade session with a delay rather than classifying it as 
proper session. However, the disadvantage in this scheme is that by the time the 
masquerader is detected it may be too late as the damage may already be inflicted.  For an 
effective detection system, the detection must be achieved as quickly as possible, ideally 
in real time.   
 
 1.2.1 Bayesian Networks and Clustering schemes for masquerade detection 
 
 Though offline evaluation of sessions produces more accurate results, the need for 
online classification cannot be substituted with offline techniques. This thesis first 
presents a Naïve Bayes classifier with deferred or n-test sessions lag classification 
technique. Our deferred Naïve Bayes classifier is also an offline classifier like the one, 
which Yung proposed, but it has a wait on varying number of test sessions before 
classifying them. This technique will be called a Deferred Naïve Bayes Classifier in the 
rest of this thesis.  
Online classification immediately classifies a test session and an offline classifier 
produces a more accurate classification.  To use the advantages of both online and offline 
classification techniques we propose a novel Bayesian networks approach to toggle 
between a Naïve Bayes Classifier and a Deferred Naïve Bayes Classifier. The Bayesian 
networks computes trust values on the simple Naïve Bayes classifier after classifying 
each test session. While the sessions are classified online using Naïve Bayes classifier, 
the Deferred Naïve Bayes classifier also works in parallel for each test sessions. If the 
trust on the Naïve Bayes classifier is less than a threshold value, then the Bayesian 
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networks signals the Deferred Naïve Bayes classifier to classify all the test sessions 
offline after it updates its classifier model with the latest test session. The latest session, 
which was not classified by the Naïve Bayes classifier, will now be classified by the 
Deferred Naïve Bayes classifier. After this classification the current classifier model of 
the Naïve Bayes classifier is replaced by the classifier model of Deferred Naïve Bayes 
classifier. The proposed cross technique update approach has several advantages.  Firstly, 
the classification is online resulting in much faster detection.  Secondly, our approach 
increases the accuracy of Naïve Bayes classifier on the classification of future sessions. 
Furthermore, the trust on this new Naïve Bayes Classifier is reset to the maximum and 
the classification of future test sessions proceeds online. 
  Chapter 4 introduces a clustering approach to train and test commands sessions. 
This approach was initially used in data mining field to cluster real time data and 
compute their likelihood patterns based on the formed clusters [5]. We propose an online 
clustering approach, which is a variant of the data mining approach presented in [5]. As 
far as we are aware, this clustering approach is novel to user command level masquerade 
detection scenario. Clustering introduces several advantages. These include a possible 
data reduction during the testing phase, simplicity of implementation and the ability to 
adapt to noisy data, which is the main reason for its success in data mining and pattern 
matching areas.     
 Our Clustering approach is further classified into three techniques based on the 
sequence rating mechanism in the testing phase. These are called Last n, Weighted 
Means and Decayed Weights Clustering analysis techniques. These three techniques are 
not new to clustering scenario but are indeed novel to masquerade detection. We intend 
 5
to test the feasibility of our clustering approach in real time to detect user command level 
masquerades and also compare the results of this approach and Bayesian networks 
scheme in this thesis.     
 Schonlau et al’s user command log files [7] were used in all our experiments. The 
main objective of these analyses was to reduce the false and missing alarm rates and try 
to achieve better results than previously proposed techniques. The three clustering 
techniques and the Bayesian networks scheme were compared based on their results. A 
ROC curve for these techniques was drawn and a detailed discussion based on this curve 
is presented in section 5.3 for comparing the two schemes. The rest of the thesis is 
outlined below. 
 In chapter 2 we present a review of previous work in masquerade detection; 
chapter 3 explains both the Deferred Naïve Bayes and Bayesian networks Classifier 
schemes for masquerade detection. In chapter 4 we present our clustering approach to 
masquerade detection. Chapter 5 explains the simulators that we built to detect 
masquerades and compares the results of Bayesian networks and Clustering approach by 
the means of ROC (Relative Operating Characteristic) curve. Chapter 6 concludes our 
research with potential future work.   
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     CHAPTER II 
              LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
          2.1 Early Research 
 
 Several attempts to tackle the problem of masquerade detection have been 
proposed. The first system was IDES (Intrusion detection Expert Systems), which dated 
to the middle of 1990’s. The problems solved by IDES were misuse and anomaly 
detection. To detect misuse an expert system was built to identify a set of vulnerabilities 
that could be taken advantage of by the user. Such a system was very effective and was 
able to alarm lot of misuses, but one major drawback is that it is not sensitive to novel 
attacks. New vulnerabilities would have greater damaging impact and can open up many 
ways of attacking systems. In order to detect such novel attacks another statistical or 
pattern recognition system was built along with the expert system to identify deviant 
behavior from the normal ones [2]. Such statistical classifiers or pattern recognizers 
combined with the expert systems formed a complete IDES. 
 
          2.1.1 Audit Trails for threat identification  
                      
 Auditing is a methodical examination of a subject’s behavior while reviewing 
their current moves with already existing trails or acceptable standards. Anderson was the 
first to study the feasibility of automated audit trail analysis. He categorized the threats 
that could be addressed by audit trail analysis as the following [16] [1]: 
 External penetrators (who are not authorized to use the computer) 
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 Internal penetrators (who are authorized use of the computer but are not 
authorized for data, program or resource accessed), including the following: 
             -Masqueraders (who operate under another user’s id and password). 
                   -Clandestine users (who evade auditing access controls). 
 Misfeasors (authorized users of the computer and resources who misuse their 
privileges). 
Masqueraders can be detected by observing departures from established patterns 
of use for individual users. 
 
         2.1.2 Measures for detecting Intrusions 
 
 There are two types of measures for detecting intrusions in a computer system. 
These are:  a) Continuous measures and b) Discrete measures. Continuous measures take 
into account the CPU Time, amount of memory used, protection violations and I/O Time. 
Discrete measures are concerned with finite set quantities such as time of login and 
location of login. We outline some of these discrete and continuous measures. 
• Continuous Measures: A continuous measure is a function of some aspect of a 
user session. This aspect has its effect on the system’s resource usage. Some of 
the continuous measures are as follows. 
 Connect time – This is the length of the user session on the target system. 
Each session is referred to as the job and has a unique job number. 
 CPU Time – It is the amount of processing time consumed in each of the 
user session on the target system. 
 8
 IO Activity – This is the amount of I/O activity in a given user session. 
 Protection violations – It is the number of directory and file access 
violations in a user session on the target system. 
 
• Discrete Measures: A discrete measure is a function of user session whose range 
of value is a finite unordered set that is used to characterize some aspect of user 
behavior. Some of the discrete measures are: 
- Time of Login – Time of login is the number of sessions for each user for 
a time period of the day. 
- Location of login – It is the number of sessions for each user initiated from 
a particular physically identifiable location. 
 
    2.2 Hypothesis 
 
An audit record contains information related to an action performed by the user. 
Each measure of the impact of an action on the system is logged as a field of the audit 
record. We view each entry in the audit record as a variable reflecting a part of the user 
behavior. There are several levels of monitoring defined by a number of researchers. One 
of the foremost levels that gained more attention is the command level. 
A command level takes into account the various commands issued by the user 
during a session. We maintain a sequential relationship between the commands issued by 
a specific user in a given session. Command usage depends upon the role of the users. So 
a user with a specific role in an organization has privileges to some commands and 
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restriction to others. The concept here is that after some elapsed period of experience 
every user gets set into a groove of using a set of commands in almost the same order. In 
other words it becomes a habit for the user to use a set of commands every time he logs 
into a system. Such habitual use of commands give us the necessary pattern that we are 
looking for to establish a user’s character.  
For example in a session user “A” opens directory1 only once to check its 
contents. The reason may be that it contains some important files that are required by his 
agency. If a masquerader opens this directory many times and also tries to access the files 
in it, then it can be marked an intrusion. 
Moreover, based on his work style the user may start off with checking his mail 
and reading through some newspapers after logging in; this is a habit for the user and it 
should occur every time when he logs into the system. If an intruder has the system in his 
hands then he overlooks these petty patterns that are learnt by the system and he tries to 
accomplish his task by checking for the file locations. This is an easy case of intruder 
detection scenario. 
Some user command types that will be considered in this thesis are: 
• Multi-Threaded process commands 
• Mailer usage commands 
• File/Directory listing commands 
          2.3 Recent Research 
 
 Schonlau et al. conducted their first experiment [14] based on UNIX commands 
that were keyed in by 70 users. Actually, a log of these commands was taken by using the 
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UNIX acct auditing mechanism. For every user a set of 15000 commands was recorded 
over a maximum period of one month. Out of these 70 users, 50 users were randomly 
selected and considered as legitimate users and the remaining 20 users were used as 
masqueraders. For the legitimate users, the first 5000 commands of each user was used as 
training data for that user and the remaining 10000 commands were used as testing data. 
These 10000 commands were interspersed with a masquerading user’s command 
sessions. A session is actually a set of 100 commands. Hence with 10000 testing 
commands we now have 100 sessions to test. An example to illustrate the crust of 
Scholau technique is given below. 
 User1 has 15000 commands on the whole in his log file. So from a total of 150 
sessions the first 50 sessions are used for training and the remaining 100 sessions are 
interspersed with sessions of say user2, user60 and user21. These sessions are now the 
masquerading sessions. The assumptions here are that, if we have a masquerading session 
then the probability of the next session being followed by the masquerading session from 
the same masquerader is 0.8 and the probability that another masquerader’s session will 
immediately follow one masquerading session is 0.1. This means that if one 
masquerading session is to follow another masquerading session then the probability that 
the session comes from the same masquerader is very high. The chances of one 
masquerader to be followed by another masquerader will be such that there are at least 
two proper sessions in between the sessions of the two different masqueraders. 
 The review paper by Schonlau et al. describes an experiment in which six 
masquerade detection schemes are compared on the same user data spliced with 
masqueraders. The actual target that was achieved was from the range of 39.4% to 69.3% 
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for hit rates and 1.4% to 6.7% for false-alarm rate. The results achieved may seem poor 
but considering the difficulty of the problem the results are good. The problem to be 
addressed here is the false alarm rate. This rate of even 1% in a real world scenario can 
be very costly and might lead to a lot of system resource and time wastage. Figure 1 
shows the results of Schonlau et al. graphically. The six schemes used by them are 
explained elaborately in the following paragraphs. 
 Bayes 1-Step Markov. This detector is based on single-step transitions from one 
command to the next and is due to DuMouchel [14]. The detector actually looks for 
transition of commands and it compares the trained user histories for such transitions. 
The comparison used here is actually a probabilistic comparison. It was a best performer 
for correct detections, but failed to accomplish the desired false alarm rates. 
 Hybrid Multi-Step Markov. This method is based on Markov chains, and is due 
to Ju and Vardi [14] [7]. Based on the proportion of the testing data the model toggles 
itself from a Markov model to a simple independence model, depending on the 
proportion of commands in the test data that were not observed in the training data. It had 
the highest performance rate when compared to other techniques. 
 IPAM. This detector is based on single-step command transition probabilities, 
estimated from the training data. IPAM stands for Incremental Probabilistic Action 
Modeling and was developed by Davison and Hirsh [14]. They actually developed this 
for predicting sequences of user actions. The results of this method ranks among the 
lowest-performing groups. 
 Uniqueness. This method was due to Schonlau and Theus [14] and used the ideas 
of command frequency detection. If a command frequently occurs for most of the 
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sessions of the user then the next session that has the same frequency of commands will 
be classified as a proper session. If an unusual command is seen in a session then the 
session will be classified as a masquerading session. Uniqueness was a poor performer to 
detect proper session but performed better to reduce false sessions. The false alarm rate 
attained by this scheme was close to 1%. 
 Compression. This method uses the logic that the new data from a given user 
compresses at about the same ratio as the old data from that same user. If this is the case 
then the masquerading user’s data compression ratio should certainly vary significantly. 
Thus one can distinguish between a masquerader and a legitimate user. This idea belongs 
to Karr and Schonlau [15] and the results of this work are shown in Figure 1. 
Compression showed the worst results of all the schemes used for testing. 
 
     
Figure 1: Relative operating characteristic (ROC) curve for the Naïve Bayes  
   Classifier (with updating) on SEA data.  
 
    
  The Schonlau et al technique is called the SEA configuration or the SEA 
technique. The graph in Figure 1 is the ROC curve for the Naïve Bayes Classifer and it 
also includes the best-outcome results achieved by SEA techniques. In other words the 
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graph shows the relative best outcomes of different schemes proposed by Schonlau et al 
with the Naïve Bayes scheme. The Y-axis of the graph measures the % hit rate and the X-
axis measures the % False Alarms. From the graph it is evident that the Bayes-One Step 
Markov had better hit rate to false alarm rate ratio. When one talks about masquerade 
detection the false alarm rates should also be considered. In fact false alarm rates can 
cause 6 times more loss than the hit rate measure. Considering these the Hybrid Multi-
Step Markov scheme is the best performer amongst the Schonlau et al schemes. It has a 
hit rate close to 50% with a false alarm rate of 2%. 
 
  2.4 The Naïve Bayes Approach for Classification 
 
  The naïve Bayes approach for anomaly detection considers the masquerade 
detection problem as a text classification problem. This classification algorithm was 
initially used to classify text documents based on specific word counts as either sports, 
theatrical, health or politics article. It was typically called “bag of words” approach as it 
profiles documents simply based on word frequencies. 
 Maxion and Townsend [12] were the first to formulate the masquerade detection 
problem as a classification problem. The classification paradigm is shown in Figure 2. 
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    Figure 2: Classification Paradigm. 
 
 
 Figure 2 shows that Maxion and Townsend further probed into the data prepared 
by Schonlau et al. to consider the possibility of masquerading effect of the remaining 49 
users to the user whose profile is being monitored. The classification paradigm works 
appropriately for the dataset prepared by Schonlau et al. It is more likely to work now 
since 2450 artificial masquerading sessions are at hand to be studied during the training 
phase itself. These masquerading sessions give a better knowledge of how one user will 
be victimized by the remaining 49 users who are insiders. The classification paradigm 
thus explored more possibilities in the SEA configured data. In a more general setting the 
dataset of a malicious user may not be like the typically well behaved user. Here an 
improvisation of the use of dataset was tried out to achieve better results. Apparently, 
pooling the 49 other users into one single intruder class provided a more stable 
classification problem. 
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          2.4.1 Bag-of-Words Model 
 
 A text document can be easily classified based on the frequency of some words 
used in the document. This simple model was proven to be more successful than 
complicated models in the classification of text. Some complex models involved 
sequence information for text-classification but the bag-of-words model has proven to be 
more efficient and simpler than most of the algorithms. 
 After looking into the success of this model as a text classifier, Maxion and 
Townsend realized that this model could be used to categorize a set of commands as 
being used by a particular user. This classification comes after training the model to first 
identify the probability of use of each command by a user and then using this as 
classifying information to classify the future sessions as either proper or masquerading 
session [12]. A mathematical explanation of this model is given in the following 
paragraphs. 
 The main assumption of this model was that the user generates a sequence of 
commands, one at a time, with a fixed probability that is independent of the commands 
preceding it. The probability for each command c for a given user u is based on the 
frequency with which the command was seen in the training data, and is given by: 
 
                    
 
 Where Training Countc,u is the count of command c from all the sessions in the 
training phase produced by user u, Training Data Length = 5000, which is the count of all 
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the commands seen in the training phase, α is the pseudocount and A is the number of 
distinct commands (i.e. the alphabet) in the data. The pseudocount can be any real 
number, and was set to 0.01 in the study. The pseudocount’s effect is to make sure that 
there aren’t any commands with a zero count. The ‘α’ in the denominator balances the 
effect of α in the numerator. The probability that a test sequence of commands “x x y y x” 
was generated by user1, u1, is: 
   Pu1,x  *  Pu1,x  *  Pu1,y  * Pu1,y * Pu1,x  
Or (Pu1,x) 3 * (Pu1,y) 2 where Pu1, x is the probability that user1 typed the command x. 
Probability of the command x being not typed by user1 can also be computed and if the 
ratio of the probability of command being typed by user1 is greater than the probability 
of not being typed by user1, then command x can be associated to be typed by user1. 
 The data used in this work is the same used by Schonlau et al. [13]. As mentioned 
before these commands were captured from UNIX acct auditing mechanism. Here only 
two fields were captured i.e. the command name and the user. This limitation was 
imposed for privacy reasons. Some commands that were captured are: sed, eqn, troff, 
dpost, echo, sh, cat, netstat, tbl, sed, eqn, sh and so on. 
 
    2.4.2 1v49 Experimental setup 
 
 Maxion and Townsend’s experimental setup was called the 1v49 experiment [12]. 
A major drawback of Schonlau et al. experiment was that not all users were tested as 
masqueraders; rather a different set of 20 users were considered as masqueraders. This 
kind of analysis doesn’t use the dataset available to its maximum. When an algorithm 
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fails to identify a masquerader block, when checked for only one masquerader, we cannot 
really make out whether the problem really is with the algorithm or with the inappropriate 
use of the available data set. To address these shortcomings the experiment conducted by 
Maxion and Townsend considered the rest 49 users log files as masquerade data. This 
configuration was consistent in the number and origin of the masquerade events 
encountered by each detector. The result of such use of the dataset considered 2450 
sessions of masquerade attacks for every user rather than 0-24 sessions of attacks 
considered by Schonlau et al. Such effective use of the available dataset brought better 
results than Schonlau’s techniques and this is clearly shown in Figure 1. 
 
   2.4.3  Update problems in naïve Bayes Classification Method 
 
 In naïve Bayes classification with update model as proposed by Maxion and  
Townsend [12] a Single-Step update was made i.e. whenever an update of the user profile 
is made the decision that the session is either a proper session or a masquerading session 
was made in just one step. In other words a binary decision was made at each step and 
this may sometimes cause a complete collapse of the entire classification.  
Two scenarios that might cause this mishap are, firstly when a masquerade 
session is classified as a true session without proper evidence. This might cause the future 
user sessions to be wrongly classified and there are chances for getting a lot of false-
negatives. A false-negative session is one in which a masquerade session is falsely 
classified as a true session. This means that an intruder takes over the system. Secondly, 
an intruder session might look like a true session and it needs further profile updates to 
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classify it. Under these circumstances if the classifier puts this session into a proper 
session and after a few more classifications, if this session is not still seen, then we start 
doubting the correctness of this session classification.  
All these problems can only be solved if the decision taken to classify the sessions 
is made backtrackable. If we had a mechanism that would classify a session later it would 
become easier for us to classify the sessions that we doubted, later, based on the new 
updated profile which now contains more stronger information for classification. This can 
be called a more “Consistent-Update” mechanism. If the algorithm decides when to 
classify these sessions then this mechanism now becomes a more “Self-Consistent 
Update” mechanism. 
 Figure 3 below shows the back tracking problems involved in Maxion and 
Townsend mechanism and also explains a self-consistent update mechanism as a solution 
for backtracking.              
         
                
 Figure 3: Single-step and self-consistent update mechanisms. 
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                       CHAPTER III 
 
               BAYESIAN NETWORKS APPROACH 
 
           3.1 Bayesian Networks 
 
 A Bayesian Network is a “Probabilistic Belief Network” [17] represented in the 
form of a DAG (Direct Acyclic Graph) [6].  The properties of the Bayesian Network are 
summarized below. 
• Each node in the graph represents a variable or propositions.  
• The relationship between the variables is represented by the links between the 
nodes. For Example: If a node “A” is connected to a node “B” with a downward 
arrow, then node “A” is the parent of node “B” and it directly influences the node 
“B”.  
• Every node in the network has a conditional probability table to keep the specific 
influence ratio that all parents pass to this node. 
• There are no cycles in the graph. 
A simple diagram of a Bayesian network is shown in Figure 4. 
         
Figure 4: A Simple Bayesian Network. 
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We can compute the joint probability of all the nodes in the above network as given 
below. 
 
P (N1, N2, N3, N4, N5, N6, N7, N8) = 
 P(N5|N2) * P(N6|N3) * P(N7|N3) * P(N8|N3, N4) * P(N2|N1) * P(N3|N1) * P(N4|N1). 
 
 For each node in the network we can specify a conditional probability using a 
table of its ancestors and its possible value. This is called the Conditional Probability 
Table (CPT). Each row in the CPT represents a possible case for the nodes considered 
and the corresponding value involved. An example of CPT is shown in Table 1. If both 
the parent nodes N3 and N4 are true then the probability of N8 to be true is 0.8. Similarly 
the remaining three conditions of the nodes N3 and N4 result in the probabilities of 0.7, 
0.35 and 0.1 for N8 to be true. 
 
         N3           N4        P(N8=T) 
          T            T          0.90 
          T            F          0.70 
          F            T          0.35 
          F            F          0.1 
 
          Table 1: Conditional Probability for N8 
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     3.2     Classification of the user sessions using trained  
                                         Naïve Bayesian Networks of commands 
 
  We used the user’s truncated UNIX commands log files created by Schonlau et al 
[13] for training and testing. This dataset contains 15000 commands for 50 users. The 
first 5000 commands of each user are true commands, in other words these were 100% 
pure commands that were typed by the genuine user. The remaining 10000 commands 
contain interspersed masquerade sessions in them. A session consists of 100 commands. 
These commands for each user were built over a period of time using the UNIX 
accounting command that takes a log of user typed commands namely “acct”. After 
building 15000 commands for each of the 50 users Schonlau et al. carefully injected 
command sessions of another 20 users after 5000 commands of each user. So, starting 
from command number 5001 we have masquerade commands interspersed with genuine 
user’s commands.  
 Schonlau et al. used the first 5000 commands to train their models and then using 
these trained models the sessions after 5000 commands were tested for masquerade 
sessions without any idea of what a masquerade session would look like. Maxion and 
Townsend [12] went a step forward to create masquerade sessions using the 5000 
commands of the other users during the training session itself. This gave an idea of what 
a masquerade session would look like before the testing phase. Kwong H. Yung [18] then 
changed the method of updating the user sessions by using a self consistent update 
mechanism rather than single-step update mechanism. He also proposed a feedback 
mechanism to update sessions correctly. 
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   3.2.1 Naïve Bayesian Network    
 
 The analysis that we will perform will consists of two phases 
• Training Phase 
• Testing Phase. 
  In the training phase a user log file is chosen. The first 5000 commands of 
this log file will be scanned by our classifier and forms a model for the genuine user. We 
also create an artificial masquerader model for the user under investigation from another 
log file of 5000 commands that was formed by picking up sessions of 100 commands 
from the remaining user log files. This artificial masquerade file makes the remaining 
users masqueraders and tests the sessions of the investigating user with a prior knowledge 
of intrusions based on the formed masquerade model. After the training phase is complete 
we have a two-layered Naïve Bayesian network of commands and models. Such a 
network is shown in Figure 5. 
 
        
Figure 5: A Naïve Bayesian Networks of command proportions and Classes formed after               
     the training phase for a user 
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 In figure 5, U= Proper User Class that consists of probabilities of commands from 
the first 5000 commands in the user log file and M = Masquerader Class that consists of 
probabilities of commands from 5000 commands in the artificially created masquerader 
file. 
   The first layer of Bayesian network consists of probabilities of all possible 
commands seen in training and the second layer represents the class node that is derived 
from the command probability layer. For each user such Bayesian networks of commands 
and classes can be imagined. Since this is a simple classification problem based on the 
command count the above Bayesian networks setup forms our Naïve Bayes classifier. So 
the figure above is actually a naïve Bayesian network of possible commands proportions 
in one layer and the class to which such proportions of commands is assigned in the other 
layer. The command probability layer forms our model parameters and contributes to the 
mixture proportion of the class in the next layer. After the training phase the Bayesian 
network formed represents an initial configuration of user and artificial masquerade 
classes.   
 
        3.2.2 Deferral mode for classifying test sessions 
  
 Basically there are two types of classification in our test sessions. 
• Offline Classification 
• Online Classification 
 In Offline classification all test sessions can be classified with some lag. 
In other words we wait for the arrival of say “t” test sessions and only after the arrival of 
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the tth test session we would classify all 1 to t sessions. Offline classification allows 
backtrack updating of test sessions. This backtracking mechanism allows for a 
probabilistic classification of each test sessions rather than binary 0 or 1 classification 
provided by the Naïve Bayes classifier. Each test session is assigned a probabilistic score 
which is recomputed a number of times as and when new test sessions arrive. Since each 
test session is scored in a sequential manner until t test sessions arrive, offline 
classification produces better results. The fact that the Schonlau data is contaminated 
with successive masquerade sessions in 80% of the cases and that each test session is 
scored in an overlapping manner due to the wait on tth test session, the offline mechanism 
produces lower false and missing alarms. 
 Online classification makes a binary decision on each test session in a 
greedy fashion. In other words each session is classified at once as either proper or 
masquerade sessions. This could be harmful in cases where we have a false alarm and an 
update was not made, as this could cause more false alarms. The test session commands 
are added to the initial command proportions computed during the training phase as 
shown in figure 5. Hence, new probabilities are computed for each command during the 
testing phase. The larger the ratio of the probability of commands of User class to that of 
Masquerader class the greater the evidence of assigning the test sequence to the user. 
 Our Deferred Naïve Bayes Classifier is an Offline classifier. As 
discussed in the previous paragraphs we assign a probabilistic score to each of the test 
sessions and keep computing the multiple scores for each of the previous test sessions 
until some point where we need to classify all our test sessions. This means that we defer 
our decision to classify our test sessions until the arrival of say “t” test sessions. Once “t” 
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sessions arrive we make our classification of the waiting sessions that were “t” sessions 
behind. Such a deferral mode will surely produce optimal results than the simple Naïve 
Bayes classifier of Maxion and Townsend [12], since it also uses the information of “t” 
test sessions that follow to classify the waiting session.  
 
  3.2.3 Bayesian Network Detector for masquerade detection 
 
 In our analysis we propose to test for a wait on “t” sessions to classify test 
sessions. The trust node in our Bayesian Networks decides “t”. The Bayesian Networks 
detector that we propose makes use of the advantages of both online and offline 
techniques. In other words the Bayesian Network toggles between a Naïve Bayes 
Classifier and a Deferred Naïve Bayes Classifier based on a trust criterion. Such a 
Bayesian Network is shown in Figure 6. The figure shows two types of detectors working 
in parallel on the test sessions. Initially a trust level of 1 is set on the Naïve Bayes 
Classifier. As new test sessions arrive the trust level is computed based on the ratio of 
correct and incorrect classifications. An incorrect classification on complete real-time 
IDS would consist of only false alarms. In other words when there is a false alarm the 
genuine user reports it as a bug to a bug database. This information can be used to 
compute the new trust of our trust node. In our analysis we already know the 
classifications of all the test sessions. This is because we interspersed some masquerade 
test sessions into the genuine user sessions. So we computed incorrect sessions based on 
this test session classification table. In other words our incorrect classifications accounted 
for both false and missing alarms. 
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 A threshold of 0.7 was set on the trust node. This threshold limit is adjustable and 
it represents the maximum erroneous classifications that our detector would accept. Once 
the trust on the Naïve Bayes classifier is reduced to 0.7, our Bayesian Networks Detector 
fires the Deferred Naïve Bayes Detector to classify the test sessions it has seen so far. 
This includes the new test session, which was not classified by Naïve Bayes Classifier. 
After this classification the trust node is reset to its initial setting and the Naïve Bayes 
Classifier model is updated with the Deferred Naïve Bayes Model. This tunes the Naïve 
Bayes Classifier and we could expect better results than before since the substituted 
model is from an offline classifier. 
         
 Figure 6: Bayesian Networks Detector with Naïve Bayes and Deferred Naïve  
      Bayes Classifiers.  
 
 
 In Figure 6, NB = Naïve Bayes Classifier and DNB = Deferred Naïve Bayes 
Classifer. The trust node (Trust) toggles between the Naïve Bayes and Deferred Naïve 
Bayes based on the threshold set. When the Deferred Naïve Bayes Classifier announces 
its results, we could even crosscheck if some of our previous sessions were classified 
incorrectly by the Naïve Bayes Classifier. 
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      3.2.4 Offline classification of Deferred Naïve Bayes Classifier  
 
  A Deferred Naïve Bayes Classifier performs an offline classification of a session. 
Whenever a new test session arrives, we compute the model parameters pc and p’c for 
each command by including the test session commands with the already existing model 
parameters. A detailed explanation of these parameters is presented in section 3.2.5. 
When computing the model parameters we use the expectation formula to compute the 
probability that the session is a masquerade or proper session. This is given as a score for 
the current session. In the Naïve Bayes classifier we make an instant binary classification 
decision.  
 Since we provide a probabilistic score we can keep scoring the current test session 
until a point where we could say that the session has a good evidence to be classified as a 
proper or masquerade session. The fact that Schonlau’s data has continuous proper and 
masquerade sessions, help in this offline classification of test sessions. Thus a test 
session’s decision can be deferred until we encounter few more test sessions so that the 
probabilistic score that is assigned to the test sessions becomes more trustable so that we 
could now classify the session without much doubt. A mathematical explanation of this 
discussion is provided in session 3.2.5.  
 
  3.2.5 Explanation of Naive Bayes and Deferred Naïve Bayes 
 Classifiers 
  The Naïve Bayes classifier was explained in section 2.4.1 where we provided a 
brief introduction to the Bag of words model. For each session a certain probability of 
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every command occurs based on its count in that session. This probability of a command 
now becomes our point of focus. To be precise, the probability that a test sequence of 
commands “x x y y x” was generated by user1, u1, is: 
   Pu1,x  *  Pu1,x  *  Pu1,y  * Pu1,y * Pu1,x  
Or (Pu1,x) 3 * (Pu1,y) 2, where Pu1, x is the probability that user1 typed the command x. 
Based on the command probabilities we now build a session node that has a conditional 
probability of all commands that form its parent node.  
 Similar probability estimation will be made for session2 also and in this manner 
all the sessions in training will have their respective parent command nodes contributing 
their probability of occurrence for each of the session nodes. This is clear from Figure 7. 
The first layer shown in figure 7 is a layer of command probabilities and the second layer 
has two different nodes. The S node represents the genuine user sessions and the M node 
represents the artificial masquerade user sessions during the training phase. The arrows 
from layer 1 to layer 2 indicate that each session receives some contribution of command 
probability from layer one. 
 One important thing to be noted here is if there is no contribution by a command 
in a session then its probability contribution is assigned a value “α” equal to 0.01 (see 
section 2.4.1). “α”  is called the psuedocount and is added to both the numerator and 
denominator of the Bayes formula shown in section 2.4.1.In this way we form a complete 
set of training session nodes for both the proper sessions and the artificial masquerade 
sessions.  
Figure 7 represents the Bayesian network consisting of 50 genuine sessions of a 
user and 50 artificial masquerade sessions picked from the remaining 49 users. That is if 
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we are monitoring user1’s commands then the remaining 49 user’s (user2 to user50) 
sessions will form artificial masquerade sessions for user1. In this way we can build our 
Bayesian network for each of the users under surveillance. For each of the session nodes 
the respective conditional probability is calculated based on the commands in that 
session. These conditional probabilities can be later used for classifying future test 
sessions and updating them into the network. An example CPT is shown in table 2. 
   
 Figure 7: Bayesian Networks for the set of artificial masquerade and   
      proper sessions after training phase. 
 
 
 
 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: CPT for various sessions based on the command count Probabilities. 
A Similar table can be constructed for masquerade sessions also. Since this is a 
command counting problem considering only session information in the training phase 
to classify sessions will not be of great help. Instead of computing the conditional 
probabilities of each session we could compute the conditional probability of all 
commands in the training phase and form masquerade and proper classes. The stronger 
P(C1)  P(C2)        …  P(Cn)     P(Si)  
0.0002 0.0003        …  0.005  0.000034 
0.009 0.0008        …  0.0007  0.000056 
    . 
    . 
    . 
    . 
    . 
    . 
        . 
        . 
        . 
    . 
    . 
    . 
        . 
        . 
        . 
 
0.0023 0.0000034        …  0.000789  0.0000089 
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the evidence, the chances of a correct classification increase. Moreover, it is very 
difficult in reality to expect accurate classifications using a session’s conditional 
probability.  Thus in practice we don’t compute the conditional probability values as 
explained above in Table 2. Since we know the identity of all the training sessions we 
consider the joint conditional probability of all the training sessions and we compute 
two classes as shown in Figure 5.  
As explained before we classify our new test sessions using a Bayesian trust 
network that toggles between a Naïve Bayes and Deferred Naïve Bayes Classifiers. 
So, before testing begins the classes that were formed in training are used as initial 
classifiers. We update this initial classifier during our testing phase and use this updated 
classifier at each step to classify future sessions. Actually we build two different 
classifiers for our Bayesian Networks approach, one for Naïve Bayes and another for 
Deferred Naïve Bayes. Once the trust node toggles to Deferred Naïve Bayes we first 
classify the new test session with the Deferred Naïve Bayes model, replace our Naïve 
Bayes classifier model with the Deferred Naïve Bayes classifier model and then proceed 
with this model on the Naïve Bayes classifier. Once again our Deferred Naïve Bayes 
model starts its offline classification all over again and waits for its chance to classify the 
test sessions.  
     3.3 A Mathematical analysis of Naïve Bayes and Deferred Naïve Bayes 
     Classifiers 
 
 The following discussion illustrates the mathematical model of the 
classifiers used in the masquerade detection problem. 
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We first explain how we compute the model parameters for naïve Bayes 
classifier and then present how expectation scores were computed for Deferred Naïve 
Bayes classifier. This is followed by a brief explanation of the Bayesian Network 
toggling approach.  
 
1. Conditional Probability of a session of  Uk (User k) based on the probabilities of 
command frequencies is, 
   )()(
1
∏
=
=
n
i
ik CPSP  , Where P (Ci) is the probability of occurrence of command ‘i’ 
in the session k of 100 commands and P (Sk) is the conditional probability of the 
session k based on the command frequencies. 
i.e. P (Sk) = P(C1)Nuk1P(C2) Nuk2…P(Cj) Nukj, for all Ci with NUki (Number of times 
user k used command j) > 0 i.e. if there is no contribution of a command in a 
session then that command is assigned probabilities based on our adjusting 
parameter α  as explained in section 2.4.1. 
 
2. Let Cs denote the sequence of commands in session number “s”. By Bayes 
inversion formula the posterior probability P (U|Cs) of user U given the sequence 
s is, 
P (U|Cs) = P (Cs|U) P (U)/P (Cs) i.e.  α  P(Cs|U) P (U). 
Where, P (u) is the prior probability for user u, and P (Cs|U) is the probability that 
the sequence Cs was generated by user u. In practice, Cs is assigned to the user 
 u0 = argmax{P (Cs|u) P (u) |u = 1, 2…, U}, among U different users. In other 
words, the session Cs is assigned to the user u0 who most likely generated that 
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session. This rule is the optimal Bayes rule under the usual uniform loss function 
for misclassification. In the naive-Bayes model, each command is assumed to be 
chosen independently of the other commands. User u has probability PUC of 
choosing command C. Because each command is chosen independently, the 
probability, P (Cs|U), that user u produced the sequence Cs = (cs1, cs2 . . . , csk . . . , 
cszs) of commands in session number s, is simply 
   , Where 
 , is the total count of command c in session “s” [4]. 
 
3. From now on let pc and p’c be the probability of command c in a proper and 
masquerading session respectively. We compute the log likelihood Ls of a test 
session s up to an additive constant as shown in equation 1 
 Ls = (1 - l s) (log (1 - ε  ) +∑
=
C
c
pcnsc
1
log ) + l s (log ε  +∑
=
C
c
cpnsc
1
'log )              (1) 
  ε  and 1-ε  are the prior probabilities that a session is proper and 
 masquerading. In our entire analysis these values where fixed to 0.5.  
  Assuming that all the test sessions are generated independently of each 
 other, the cumulative log-likelihood Lt after t test sessions is up to an additive 
 constant 
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 Here  ω t+ and ω ’t+ are the cumulative numbers of proper and 
masquerading sessions respectively; nt+c  and n’t+c are the cumulative counts of 
command c amongst proper and masquerading sessions, respectively, in the t total 
observed test sessions. 
    
 
4. Rare classes and rare commands may not be properly reflected in the training set. 
Therefore to avoid zero estimates, smoothing is applied to the maximum-
likelihood estimators. This smoothing can also be motivated by shrinkage 
estimation under Dirichlet priors on the parameters ε , pc  and p’c 
Here the parameters ε , pc  and p’c are drawn from known prior 
distributions with the fixed parameters, and simple standard Bayesian analysis is 
applied. Based on this discussion we compute the new cumulative posterior 
likelihood L~t as in equation 7. 
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Here, n0+c and n’0+c are the total counts of command c in the proper and 
masquerading sessions of the training sessions. 
 
5. Using equation 7 we compute our model parameters ε , pc  and p’c as shown in the 
equations below, 
                   (8) 
 
                                                (9) 
 
                (10) 
 
After the training phase we compute initial classifier model θ 0 by 
neglecting the test session command counts in the equations 8, 9 and 10. As the 
test sessions arrive we include the test session command counts and compute 
the new model parameters, which reflect the influence of the test sessions. 
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6. If we use Naïve Bayes classifier then we need to immediately classify the newly 
arrived test session. This is done by finding out the ratio of the newly obtained 
model with the initial model. If the ratio of pc  to pc0 is greater than p’c to p’c0 
then we classify the test session as proper session, else as masquerade session. 
 
7. In the case of Deferred Naïve Bayes classifier we use probability values to 
estimate the test sessions proximity of being a masquerade or proper session. 
Equation 11 below shows how a session can be assigned a probability value. Let 
us call this a score. Hence our test sessions are scored as and when they arrive. 
Since we use a backtracking method to score our test sessions we keep updating 
the scores as new test sessions arrive. In other words multiple scores are provided 
for each of our already seen test sessions before we see the last or the tth test 
session. At this stage when the tth test session arrives our Deferred Naïve Bayes 
classifier classifies the test sessions as proper or masquerade if the probability 
scores are below and above 0.5 respectively. 
The equation used to score each of our test session is as below, 
  P(ls=1|Cs;θ t) = (P(ls=1;θ t) P(Cs|ls=1;θ t ))/P(Cs;θ t)        (11) 
 where, 
  P(Cs;θ t) = P(ls=0;θ t) P(Cs|ls=0;θ t )+ P(ls=1;θ t) P(Cs|ls=1;θ t ).  
 
8. Our Bayesian network first places a trust of 100% on the Naïve Bayes Classifier.  
 36
So we consider the model parameters computed by this classifier initially to 
classify our test sessions online. Each time when we classify a session incorrectly 
the trust value on the node is adjusted based on the ratio of correct to incorrect 
classifications. Once the trust level reaches 70% we toggle to our Deferred Naïve 
Bayes Detector, which was running in parallel, and classify all the sessions it has 
seen at this point. Thus the Deferred Naïve Bayes Classifier also classifies our 
new test session. At this point we update our initial Naïve Bayes model with the 
Deferred Naïve Bayes model and reset our trust node to 100% on the Naïve Bayes 
Classifier. Thus a more reliable model is now used to classify our future sessions 
using Naïve Bayes Classifier.   
 
9. During our classification of test sessions we also build a table of hits, false alarms, 
and missing alarms. This table was used to calculate the trust on the trust node 
and was also helpful to draw ROC curves during our final analysis. 
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CHAPTER IV 
          CLUSTERING OF COMMAND SESSIONS  
 
       4.1 Clustering Technique 
 
 Intrusion detectors that use audit data such as command sequences handle 
voluminous information in order to classify test sessions. More data as backend implies 
more storage area and hence more information to peruse before making a decision. 
Clustering of command sequences also has the same problem of dealing with huge audit 
data during the training phase but once dense clusters are formed the centroids of clusters 
become our point of focus. Thus there is a possible data reduction during the testing 
phase as only cluster centroids can be used while matching a test session.  
   To form clusters of command sequences we first divide a command session into 
a number of overlapping sequences. Once the sequences are formed they are clustered 
based on a sequence match criteria. Finally we have a centriod that represents the cluster 
characteristic. The amount of data to be handled while forming a cluster of similar 
records with a centroid that holds the mean characteristic of the cluster is huge [8]. A 
centroid of a cluster is like a black hole that attracts the members of the cluster toward it. 
Mathematically, a centroid is the mean value of a set of values that are closely related. 
This close relation of the members of the cluster is the most important factor of all 
clustering algorithms. After clustering, the centroids of the clusters become the point of 
interest and thus the rest of the information is deemed outdated. So while testing we can 
compare our test sequences to the cluster centroids. This might be considered as an 
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advantage of clustering technique but this also depends on the density of our clusters. The 
denser clusters will have less number of centroids to compare with our test sessions.   
Clustering approach was initially used in data mining field to cluster real time 
data and compute their likelihood patterns based on the formed clusters [5]. We propose 
an online clustering approach, which is a variant of the data mining approach presented in 
[5]. Our Clustering approach is further classified into three techniques based on the 
sequence rating mechanism in the testing phase. We propose this clustering analysis to 
study its feasibility as an Intrusion Detection System in real time. Also we compare the 
results of clustering and Bayesian Networks analysis by plotting ROC curve in section 
5.3.2.2. 
With this general picture of clustering of command sequences we now explain the 
components of our clustering mechanism and discuss our clustering algorithm in the 
following sections.  
 
       4.2 Clustering scenario of Masquerade detection using command lines.  
 
 Any solution proposed to a problem views the problem in its context. A clustering 
solution to our problem of detecting masquerades can be viewed as consisting of the 
following components. 
1. Audit Data Creator 
2. User Profile Creator 
a. Sequence Grouper 
b. Sequence Analyzer 
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c. Frequency Counter 
d. Cluster Tuner 
3. Validity Checker 
a. Sequence Scorer 
b. Alarm Raiser 
4. User Profile Updater 
          The above blocks work internally communicating with each other for two 
phases namely Training and Testing phase. A block diagram with the 
communications between various components is shown in Figure 8. A complete 
description of the components is also presented after the block diagram. 
   
                             Figure 8: Masquerade Detector based on clustering of user             
             command sequences. 
  
 
Audit Data Creator – A Log File creator that stores the log of user commands during a 
login logout session to a database called User Log Files (ULF). 
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User Profile Creator – Based on the clustering scenario a user profile creator can be 
defined as user command sequences grouper. If we present sequences of commands to a 
UPC (User Profile Creator), the output will be clusters of command sequences. A profile 
of user “u” is denoted by “Pu” which represents the set of all clusters of user u’s 
command sequences that were formed using the clustering algorithm i.e. 
           Pu = {C1, C2, C3… Cn}, where C1… Cn are clusters of user u’s command 
sequences. 
 
Sequence Grouper – A sequence grouper is a component that clusters the command 
sequences presented to it. Generally it contains the algorithmic implementation of 
clustering. 
 
Sequence Analyzer – This component examines the command sequences and finds the 
similarity between two sequences based on the underlying principle. Generally the LCS 
(Longest Common Subsequence) principle is used to match similarities between two 
sequences. Other techniques used for similarity matching are MCP (Match Count 
Polynomial Bound) that matches each slot of the command sequences considered for 
similarity checking, MCE (Match count Exponential Bound) that has an exponential 
influence for each slot that matched and MCAP (Match Count Adjacency Reward 
Polynomial Bound) that matches adjacent slots of command sequences. 
 
Frequency Counter – This section counts the distinct commands occurring in each 
sequence. It basically finds out the frequency of occurrence of each command in a 
 41
sequence. In order to find the similarity between two command sequences s1 and s2 we 
compute both the LCS and the command counts, we then match the sequences based on 
both LCS and the command counts. 
 
Cluster Tuner – The job of cluster tuner is to either split a cluster or join two clusters. 
This is explained in the algorithms given below. 
 
Validity Checker – During the testing phase this component checks the validity of the 
command sequences that are to be clustered. Validity is computed based on scoring given 
to each new sequence. 
 
Sequence Scorer – Each of the new sequence is scored based on one of the three 
techniques namely, Previous_n, Weighted and Decayed Weight techniques [10]. 
 
Alarm Raiser – This component raises an alarm if an anomalous sequence is found. 
 
Profile Updater – If a normal command sequence is found then this sequence is updated 
to the user profile i.e. it is pushed to a particular cluster. The Profile updater’s job is to 
carry out this updating of normal command sequences. 
 
                        4.3 Clustering of command Sequences – Training phase 
 The job of the sequence grouper is,  
• To cluster the command sequences based on the similarities.  
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• To compute the new centroids of the clusters.  
 
A sequence “i” of length “j” denoted by Sij is a set of j commands as shown in equation 1. 
  
                           Sij = {C1, C2   .  .   .   , Cj}, where j = 10, 11…100       (12) 
 
During the training phase a sequence is selected from the session log file and the value of 
j is set to integral values in the range [10,100]. In the testing phase the sequence grouper 
waits for online j commands and forms a sequence. 
 Two sessions S1 and S2 are considered to be similar if, 
  Match (S1, S2) ≥  Tr, Where Tr is the threshold set for similarity.                 (13) 
 
 
 A Match of two sessions Si and Sk is defined by the following equation, 
  Match (Si, Sk) = LCS (Si, Sk) + MCAP (Si
 
, Sk )         (14) 
 
 
 In equation 14 LCS is the Longest Common Subsequence between the two 
sequences Si, and Sk, and MCAP is the Match Count Adjacency reward Polynomial 
Bound. 
The Sequence Grouper Algorithm for forming clusters is given below. 
 
Sequence Grouper (Tr, Su, pu, Suc): 
 
 /* Tr is intra-cluster similarity threshold 
     Su is a set of a user u's sequences to be clustered 
     pu is the user u's profile, i.e., set of clusters 
     Suc is the set of user u's cluster centers 
     Cx is the cluster for center x*/           
 
1. Initialize pu =φ , Suc =φ , Cx = 0. 
2. Randomly select a cluster center from Su and update both Su and Suc  
      i.e. Suc = {Sl} and Su = Su - {Sl}, where Sl = sequence l considered as centroid. 
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3.   Initialize the Cluster set to φ  i.e. Cu =φ . 
4.   Include the center to the Cluster Cx i.e. Cx = {Sl } 
4.   While Su ≠ φ  do 
      5.    For j = 1 to sizeof(Su)     
                       If (Match ((Suc) x, Suj) ≥  Tr then (Where (Suc) x the cluster centroid  
       that produces the best match) 
              Cx = Cx  Υ{Suj} 
            Else Suc =  Suc Υ  { Suj}   
6                    Cx = Cx Υ  (Suc)x 
7.              Su = Su – ((Su Ι  Cx) Υ  (Suc - (Suc)x ) ) ) 
8.      Recalculate the cluster centre for the cluster Cx say RCCCx 
9.     (Suc)x= RCCCx 
10.     Cu = Cu  ΥCx (We assume that this is the latest updated Cx )      
11.      pu = pu Υ  Cu 
12. If a new sequence arrives Su = Su ΥSNew 
 
 
                                        4.3.1 Cluster Tuning 
 
 
Another important component of the sequence grouper is the cluster tuner. The 
main job of the tuner is to join two similar clusters or split the discrepancies in cluster 
into two. This actually means that we are now fine-tuning our clusters so as to reduce the 
inherent noise in the cluster. The two algorithms are given below, 
//T’ be the inter cluster similarity threshold 
   Join (T’, pu, Suc) 
1. For each pair of clusters ci and cj in the profile pu, i ≠ j 
2. If Match(ci , cj ) >= T’ 
                   ci = ci  Υ  cj // We can now unite the two clusters 
3. Recalculate the centroid for ci. 
4. pu  =    pu - cj 
5. Suc = Suc - Scj 
 
  
   Split (T, ST’, pu, Suc) 
 
1. For each Cluster ci in  the profile pu 
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2. If (T >= ST’) SequenceGrouper(Tr+1, ci , pu, Suc) 
3. pu  =    pu - cj 
4. Suc = Suc - Scj 
 
                                   
                              4.3.2 Recalculating Cluster Center 
 
 
 To recalculate cluster centers we use a lazy technique that computes 
cumulative scores considering each sequence in the cluster as the new cluster center. 
Finally the sequence with the maximum cumulative score is elected as the new centroid. 
 To match two sequences we again use the same matching criteria as shown in equation 
14.  
 Thus the new cluster centre is based on the following scoring mechanism, 
New Cluster Center = Max (Cumulative Scores of each sequence “i” in the cluster), 
where, 
 Cumulative Scores of each sequence “i” in the cluster =∑
=
t
i 1
∑
=
t
j
SjSiSim
1
),( , and i<>j. 
 
             4.4 Influence of Threshold value in cluster formation 
 
  
 Threshold values are the percentage of acceptance values that are set based on the 
problem situation and observer’s approximation. Any approximation that has a threshold 
value toward its upper bound will tend to form stringent clusters but most of the 
situations don’t want this rigid cluster formation, as the tendency to strike false alarms is 
higher. In other words strict threshold values reject similar values that were supposed to 
fall into a cluster if the rules weren’t rigid. It is therefore advisable to iterate the 
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algorithm with a loosened threshold value until we get a close match for all the values to 
be clustered. Here again we assume that all the values that were intend to be pushed into 
a cluster are proper values. We now determine a mathematical explanation for threshold 
fixation. 
 Let Tr be the threshold value to be set for clustering our command sequences,  
iω , be the density of the ith cluster that was formed based on Tr. Tr must be chosen such 
that equation 6 is met, 
     
                              ∑
=
∞→
n
i
i
1
)( ω                                                                         (15) 
  i.e. our threshold value should be such that we form more dense clusters. To 
achieve such cluster formation is not easy. In most cases we try to approximate the 
threshold values after some iteration.  
 We now discuss the technique of choosing the threshold value for our situation. 
Firstly, a command sequence length “l” is decided. Thus each sequence of commands 
will be of length “l”. This length can be chosen at random, let us say l=10 in our case. 
Now, threshold value is actually an integer value that approximates two sequences based 
on the matching function Match (S1, S2) (For Ex: sequences S1 and S2 are considered). 
If threshold Tr = 10, then we are looking for sequences such that their LCS + MCAP of 
their commands is >= 10, so as to cluster them. If we are not able to cluster some of the 
command sequences then we drop our threshold by a scale of 1. This is done until we 
reach a limit such that Tr is at least 6. That is we have an approximation of about 60%. 
After this approximation if we are still not able to cluster some of the commands we keep 
them as it is. All of the above discussion holds good for training phase. 
 46
 Generally, setting threshold value to the upper bound has its own cost of raising 
false alarms. If we set the cost function to be as below, 
                                   Cost = misses + false alarms          (16) 
We can actually have a threshold close to the upper bound. The reason is that we give 
same weight for both misses and false alarms. If the cost function was like in equation 8 
then its better to choose a threshold value somewhere close to the lower bound.   
                                  Cost = misses + 6(false alarms)         (17) 
 In equation 17 it is very costly to get a false alarm so we need to balance this out 
with our reduced threshold value. Thus choosing threshold value is critical to clustering 
problem. 
 
                                                4.5 Testing Phase 
 
 The testing phase of the clustering scenario is an online testing scenario. 
Whenever sequences arrive online we rate the sequences based on a Scoring mechanism. 
After scoring a sequence, the score value is checked with an accept threshold value to 
either cluster this sequence or reject it. If the scoring value is significantly below the 
accept threshold then the sequence is considered anomalous and immediately an alarm 
will be triggered. If the scoring value is >= threshold value then we consider this 
sequence to be produced by a normal user and thus we update this sequence to the 
already existing user profile. The accept threshold is an empirical value that is computed 
based on observation of some test sequences.  
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 The scoring mechanisms that will be used in this project are LAST n, 
WEIGHTED and DECAYED WEIGHTS.  These are explained below. 
LAST n – Here first n sequences in the testing phase are rated cumulatively and the later 
sequences are judged based on these n sequences. The rating mechanism can be 
mathematically represented as, 
                                        Rj = 1/ (j+1) )put,s'(
0
∑
=
=
jt
t
Sim  , if j<n   
                                                                 Or 
                                          Rj = 1/n ∑
+−=
j
njt
putsSim
1
),'( , if j>=n                                          (18)                                
WEIGHTED – Here the weighted mean of the last sequence’s rating is incorporated into 
the current sequences Similarity measure. The mathematical representation is given as, 
                                          
                 SCj = α  * Match (sj, pu) + (1- α ) * SCj-1                                                                                  (19) 
 
 
Here we can fix α to be a finite nonzero quantity. Generally it is fixed to 0.33. The match 
function in equation 5 actually computes the match of the new sequence with the cluster 
center for each cluster. In the equation SCj-1 actually refers to the last accepted sequence 
before the sequence j. Thus we also weigh this new sequence j with respect to the last 
accepted sequence j-1. This kind of cumulative scoring helps maintain the characteristic 
of the new sequences with already matched sequences.  
 
DECAYED WEIGHTS – This is a variation of Weighted means mechanism. Here α  is 
varied based on the current sequence. Mathematically it can be represented as, 
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                 SCj = α j * Match (sj, pu) + (1- α j) * SCj-1          (20)                                                                                    
Where α j  = α j-1 /α j-1+1-log(z/(y+j)),  and α 0 =1. Thus α j is a decaying weight as long 
as 1 - log( z/(y+j )) > 0 , also y = 6750 and z = 7500 in our analysis. 
   
               4.5.1 Predicting acceptable and unacceptable Command sequences 
 
 In order to classify the sessions that occur online as either proper or masquerade 
sessions we use the above scoring mechanisms. We empirically choose an accept 
threshold score called Seq_Accept. If the score calculated for a test sequence is >= this 
Seq_Accept value then we consider the new session as a proper session. We now call the 
Sequence Grouper algorithm to cluster this new session with the already existing clusters.  
 Profile updater does this clustering of the test sequences. The profile scorer 
carries out calculating the scores. The alarm raiser’s job is to raise an alarm if an 
anomalous session is found. Once the newly scored sessions are updated to the user 
profiles we now have a more reliable user profile database to refer to in order to classify 
future sessions. 
  4.6 Steps Involved In Training and Testing Phase 
 
The definition of keywords to be used in both the phases is given below. 
 A Command Sequence Si is a finite set of 10 commands and is represented as 
                         Si = {C1, C2, C3, …C10}. 
 A Command Session Sei is a finite set of 10 command sequences i.e., 
                         Sei = {{S1}, {S2}, {S3}, … {S10}}. 
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 A Cluster Ci of command sequences is defined on a Centroid i represented as Sci is 
a set of sequences that match closely to the centroid i and is represented as 
                           Ci = {Sj, Sa , Sn…, Sp }. 
 A profile Pu is a set of clusters that are obtained during training session i.e., 
                Pu = {C1, C2, C3… Cn}, where 1, 2...n represent the cluster centers. 
 
                                     4.6.1 Training Phase 
 
 
1. Randomly select a cluster center and try to cluster other sequences in the session 
to this centroid using the match criteria Match (Si, Sj) >= Tr. 
2. All sequences that are not clustered are considered as a set of unclassified 
sequences and a new cluster center is considered randomly for this set. Step 1 is 
then followed for this set also, this will continue until there are no more command 
sequences to cluster. 
3. In Step1 when a cluster is formed the profile of that user for whom training is 
done is updated with the cluster center. Therefore, finally when training is done 
the profile set will consist of all the cluster centroids. 
4. Once we form clusters, our next step is to tune the clusters by either joining or 
splitting them. To join two clusters we match the two centroids of the clusters. If 
we find a match we then merge the two clusters and recalculate their centroids. To 
split a cluster we pick centroids in the profile and calculate the threshold value 
based on the matching function. If this value T is much greater than the assigned 
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sequence threshold value for the centroid, we split the cluster using the Split 
algorithm. 
 
                                            4.6.2 Testing Phase             
 
1. In this phase first online command sequences are formed as the commands arrive. 
2. Each sequence is scored based on the weighted scoring phenomenon. 
a. The first sequence is scored independently  
b. The sequences that follow are scored with some weight given to the 
previous accepted sequence. 
3. After, a sequence is found to be acceptable; it is updated to the user profile by 
using the Sequence Grouper Algorithm.  
4. If a session is found to be anomalous then an alarm is triggered. 
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                                            CHAPTER V  
        BAYESIAN NETWORKS VS CLUSTERING ANALYSIS 
 
                                       5.1 A Comparative Study     
 
 Probabilistic and Clustering analysis simulators were created in C#. The User 
interfaces of these two simulators are shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10. The output 
Bayesian Networks simulator is a text file named UserX_Classifier.txt. This file contains 
the classification of test sessions into Proper and Masquerade sessions based on the 
probabilistic model θ = { cppc ',,0ε } for each command. Clustering analysis on the 
other hand produces five output text files for each analysis; these files are named as 
UserX_Classifier.txt, UserX_Sequences.txt, UserX_TestSequences.txt, 
UserX_ClustersWithScores.txt, and UserX_Testing_ClustersWithScores.txt. The 
Classier.txt file has the classification of each test session as Masquerade and Proper 
session based on the sequence rating mechanism chosen. Each session also has 
sequence’s rating along with its classification information. The Sequences.txt and 
TestSequence.txt files contain the sequences that were formed during training and testing 
phases respectively. Finally, the ClustersWithScores.txt and 
Testing_ClustersWithScores.txt files contain the clusters that were formed during training 
and testing phases. A brief overview of these two detectors is given in the following 
section. 
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 5.2. An Overview of Probabilistic and Clustering Intrusion Detectors 
            5.2.1 Bayesian Networks Intrusion Detector    
 
    
 Figure 9: A snapshot of Bayesian Networks Intrusion Detector after training  
        phase.  
 
 
 In figure 9, the Command Statistics group box shows the histogram of commands 
and the Probabilistic Model for each command is shown in the Results group box. In 
order to compute a proper and masquerade model for each command used by UserX, the 
UserX’s log file and a Maquerade log file should be selected from the UserID List and 
Masq ID List respectively. Clicking on the Train button now would generate the initial 
probabilistic model for each commands based on the first 5000 commands in the chosen 
user’s log file. The Command Statistics group box and the Results group box display the 
initial model parameters θ 0 of each commands used so far by the user. 
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 To test the command sessions simply click on the Test button. A message box 
containing the online classification of the session under investigation is displayed. This 
continues for all the test sessions. Internally two algorithms are executed in parallel. As 
explained in section 3.2.3 the trust node toggles between the Naïve Bayes and Deferred 
Naïve Bayes Algorithms. Finally the results of classification are backed up in 
UserX_Classifie.txt file.                      
                  5.2.2 Clustering based Intrusion Detector 
 
 
     Figure 10: A snapshot of Clustering Analyzer of command sequences when analyzing       
            User18.txt log file. 
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                5.2.2.1 Steps to perform clustering analysis 
 
 
1. Open a User log file for training using the Open button 
2. Select the Sequence Length and the Number of Commands to train from the 
combo boxes in Command Sequences creation group box. 
3. Click on Create Sequences to create command sequences. The output file 
UserX_Sequences.txt will be created at this step. 
4. To view the created sequences click on View Sequences button. This would pop 
up a dialog box showing the command sequences that were created. 
5. Set a threshold value using the slider control and click on the Cluster Sequences 
button. This results in the creation of UserX_ClustersWithScores.txt file that 
contains the clusters with a center sequence and the clustered sequences appended 
with their similarity Score with the center sequence. 
6. We now enter the testing phase. To test the command sessions select the number 
of sessions to test, the sequence rating mechanism and an Accept threshold value; 
click on the Test Sessions button to perform profile based testing.  
7. The result of Testing is three text files namely UserX_TestSequences.txt that 
contains all the sequences that were tested, 
UserX_Testing_ClustersWithScores.txt that contains the updated clusters that 
were formed during the testing phase and UserX_Classifier.txt that contains 
classified test sessions based on the Accept threshold and the Sequence rating 
mechanism used on the test sessions.  
8. Results in UserX_Classifier.txt can be used to plot ROC Curves for clustering 
analysis. 
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    5.3 Results and Discussions 
  5.3.1 Probabilistic analysis of truncated UNIX commands 
    5.3.1.1 A modified data scenario 
 
 Probabilistic analysis can also be carried out on command sessions with modified 
UNIX commands. Truncated UNIX commands from the Schonlau’s Masquerade data 
files can be appended with arguments to enrich the data. A data pre-processing step will 
be used to enrich some of the commands. For example, the truncated command ‘vi’ can 
be appended with the file name of the file that was viewed with the editor i.e. ‘vi’ can be 
enriched to ‘vi <File Name>’. The file name in the angle bracket now distinguishes this 
‘vi’ command from other ‘vi’ commands in the user dataset.  
In the masquerade detection scenario we assume that every user considered has a 
pattern of command usage based on the current project. Moreover, the user profiles are 
revamped based on the active project that he/she works on. The enrichment of some of 
the commands would certainly work in such situations. In case if the intruder targets on 
opening some files that the privileged user cares no more due to project change, this 
could be marked as an intrusion. Such patterns of file accesses can be added into the user 
log file’s test commands region and considered as a masquerading data pattern. To be 
more practical the training data can also added with some enriched commands to account 
for the enrichment in the test data. 
In our probabilistic analysis we only considered truncated UNIX commands from 
the Schonlau’s User log files. We limited our analysis for four users and followed the 
same for the clustering analysis also. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to include 
enriched commands and may be considered as future work.  
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     5.3.1.2 Analysis  
 
 A limited analysis was carried out due to time constraints. The following 
discussion explains how the proper and masquerade data model was built for four users. 
The Schonlau data for 50 users was used as a user data pool and just 4 users were picked 
from it to carry out our analysis. For these four users a proper and masquerade data 
model was built and the sessions were tested based on the built models.  
We Considered analysis of User1, User9, User10 and User18 log files for our 
masquerade detection problem. For detecting masquerading test sessions of User1 the 
probabilistic analysis was carried out as follows: the first 5000 commands from the log 
file of User1 was trained to build a proper user model for User1. To build a masquerade 
model for User1, 5000 commands in sets of 100 commands, making 50 sessions were 
chosen from the rest of the users and trained. The result of training was the model 
parameter θ  (ε 0, pc0, p’c0) for each command, which was computed from log likelihood 
estimation formulas. 
During the testing phase new model parameters were computed using the 
likelihood estimation formulas and finally the difference between these parameters and 
the previous step’s parameters were computed and compared to a threshold. If this 
threshold limit was not crossed then the test session was reported as a masquerade 
session, else the new session was updated by re-calculating the model parameter. The 
Bayesian Networks toggles between a Naïve Bayes and Deferred Naïve Bayes 
Algorithm. Based on the trust mechanism explained in section 3.2.3 the best classifier is 
chosen at proper time and the online classification of test sessions is continued using the 
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Naïve Bayes classifier after the its current model is replaced by the Deferred Naïve Bayes 
classifier’s offline model. 
The results of our above analysis using Bayesian Network method are shown 
below.  In this discussion only the sets of classifier graphs for four users that point out the 
proper and masquerade sessions are attached. After discussing the Clustering analysis the 
hit rate to false alarm rate graphs are discussed as ROC curves. 
 
           
        Figure11.1:  True classification of 100 Test Sessions for User1 
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  Figure 11.2: Bayesian Network Classification of 100 Test Sessions for User1 
 
 
    
 
 
                   
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 12.1: True classification of 100 Test Sessions for User9 
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 Figure 12.2: Bayesian Network Classification of 100 Test Sessions for User9 
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  Figure 13.1: True classification of 100 Test Sessions for User10 
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Figure 13.2: Bayesian Network Classification of 100 Test Sessions for User10 
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  Figure 14.1: True classification of 100 Test Sessions for User18 
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 Figure 14.2: Bayesian Network Classification of 100 Test Sessions for User18 
 
  5.3.2 Clustering Analysis of Truncated UNIX Command Sequences 
 
 
 Like most of the clustering scenarios, clustering of commands was also carried 
out in two phases. Clustering requires command sequences. We can perform a simple 
analysis by considering a command session as a command sequence. The following 
criteria were considered while forming command sequences in our clustering analysis. 
 
• If sequence length < session length then we formed overlapping sequences in both 
the training and testing phases.  
• If sequence length = session length then we formed overlapping sequences only in 
the training phase. 
• Sequence length >=10 and <=100 
 
 62
 For instance, let us consider a command session of length 5 containing five 
commands, {vi, csh, pico, netscape, pine}. An example of sequences of length 4 would 
be {vi , csh, pico, netscape} and  {csh, pico, netscape, pine}. These sequences are our 
overlapped sequences. To explain clustering of command sequences let us divide our 
discussion into two phases namely training and testing. 
 
    5.3.2.1 Training Command Sequences 
 
  The main goal of the training phase is to create user profile that would be used to 
test command sessions during the testing phase. The Sequence Creator first creates 
command sequences and Cluster Creator then clusters these sequences using our 
clustering algorithm in section 4.3. A profile of user is finally constructed with the center 
sequences. 
 In order to cluster a command sequences with center sequences we use a 
“similarity function” that has to satisfy the following criteria i.e. the Sum of Longest 
Common Subsequence (LCS) and Match Count Adjacent Reward Polynomial bound 
(MCAP) between the sequence and it’s center should be greater or equal to a threshold 
value. If this criterion is satisfied then we cluster the sequence with the center sequence 
and then a new cluster center will be recalculated from all the sequences in the cluster. 
This is done to adjust to the change that was caused due to addition of a new sequence to 
the cluster. 
 We performed Clustering analysis on the same 4 users upon whom we performed 
Probabilistic analysis. This time Schonlau’s truncated UNIX command data was used. 
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During the training phase the first 5000 commands in the user log file was used to build a 
profile for that user. The remaining commands in the log file were used to as test 
commands. The testing phase is explained below. 
 
          5.3.2.2 Testing Command Sequences 
 
 The commands after 5000 commands were analyzed in sessions of 100 
commands. The cluster centers in the user profile formed during the training phase were 
used and a match between these centers and the test sequences were established based on 
the same similarity criteria that was used in training. Actually using the same similarity 
criteria doesn’t produce accurate results. So to account for more accuracy each test 
sequence was rated based on the three methods explained in section 4.5. Our clustering 
analysis of test sequences was also based on these methods. We analyzed the test 
sequences of User1, User9, User10 and User18 based on these three rating mechanisms 
for a sequence length of 100. The results of these analyses are shown below. 
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 Figure 15: Classifications of 100 Test Sessions based on Clustering Analysis for User1. 
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 From Figure 15 we find that Last n Sequence rating method produces more false 
alarms than Weighted Means and Decayed Weights methods. Test Sessions 12, 19, 25, 
46, 56,62 and 86 were classified as masquerade sessions by Last n rating method. 
Weighted means and Decayed Weights methods produced sessions 45 and 46 as 
masquerades.       
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 Figure 16: Classifications of 100 Test Sessions based on Clustering Analysis for  
       User9. 
 
 
 Last n Sequence rater produced the worst results for User9; it classified test 
sessions 4, 5, 6, 7, 55, 64, 66, 77, 88, 96 and 99 as Masquerade sessions. So the false 
alarm count is 11. There were also two missing alarms in this classification, i.e. sessions 
44 and 45 were classified as proper sessions. Weighted means had 3 false alarms (Test 
sessions 5, 26 & 27) and no missing alarms. Finally Decayed weights produced a better 
result with just two false alarms (Test sessions 5 and 26). 
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 Figure 17: Classifications of 100 Test Sessions based on Clustering Analysis for User10. 
 
 
 For User10 Last n sequence rater produced 15 false alarms but there were no 
missing alarms. This is better compared to the previous user, as there were two missing 
alarms, which is worse. Weighted means produces 11 false alarms and Decayed weights 
stayed on 9.  
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Figure 18: Classifications of 100 Test Sessions based on Clustering Analysis for User18. 
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 For User18 there were no missing alarms and 9, 4, 5 were the false alarms 
produced by Last n, Weighted and Decayed weights sequence rating techniques 
respectively. Surprisingly here the Decayed weights method produced one extra false 
alarm. This might have been due to the slightly incorrectly tuned accept threshold value. 
 The graphical representation of clustering analysis is not very clear since three 
techniques where displayed on to the same graphs. Table 3 provides the results of 
clustering techniques in a clearer manner. The table is divided into 4 sections, one each 
for User1, User9, User10 and User18 respectively. In User1’s section we provide a 
column for the test session number (SNo.). This can be used as a reference for the other 
sections. Each of the four sections has 4 columns representing the True Classification 
(TC), Last n Classification (LN), Weighted Means Classification (WM) and Decayed 
Weights Classification (DW) of the test sessions. True classification columns have 0’s for 
proper sessions and 1’s for masquerade sessions. The other three columns of each section 
have a “+” to represent correct classifications and a “-” to represent incorrect 
classifications. Correct classifications include true positives and true negatives and 
incorrect classifications include false positives or false alarms and false negatives or 
missing alarms.  
 
          User1           User9            User10            User18 
S 
No. 
T
C 
L
N 
W
M 
D
W 
1 0 + + + 
2 0 + + + 
3 0 + + + 
4 0 + + + 
5 0 + + + 
6 0 + + + 
7 0 + + + 
T
C 
L
N 
W
M 
D
W 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 - + + 
0 - - - 
0 - + + 
0 - + + 
T
C 
L
N 
W
M 
D
W 
0 + + + 
0 + + - 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 - + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
T
C 
L
N 
W
M 
D
W 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
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8 0 + + + 
9 0 + + + 
10 0 + + + 
11 0 + + + 
12 0 - + + 
13 0 + + + 
14 0 + + + 
15 0 + + + 
16 0 + + + 
17 0 + + + 
18 0 + + + 
19 0 - + + 
20 0 + + + 
21 0 + + + 
22 0 + + + 
23 0 + + + 
24 0 + + + 
25 0 - + + 
26 0 + + + 
27 0 + + + 
28 0 + + + 
29 0 + + + 
30 0 + + + 
31 0 + + + 
32 0 + + + 
33 0 + + + 
34 0 + + + 
35 0 + + + 
36 0 + + + 
37 0 + + + 
38 0 + + + 
39 0 + + + 
40 0 + + + 
41 0 + + + 
42 0 + + + 
43 0 + + + 
44 0 + + + 
45 0 + - - 
46 0 - - - 
47 0 + + + 
48 0 + + + 
49 0 + + + 
50 0 + + + 
51 0 + + + 
52 0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + - + 
0 + - - 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 - + + 
1 - + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + - - 
0 - - - 
0 - - - 
0 - - - 
0 - + + 
0 + + + 
0 - - - 
0 - - - 
0 - + + 
0 - + + 
0 + + + 
0 - - - 
0 - - - 
0 + + + 
0 - - + 
0 - - + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 - + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 - - - 
0 - - - 
0 - + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
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53 0 + + + 
54 0 + + + 
55 0 + + + 
56 0 - + + 
57 0 + + + 
58 0 + + + 
59 0 + + + 
60 0 + + + 
61 0 - + + 
62 0 + + + 
63 0 + + + 
64 0 + + + 
65 0 + + + 
66 0 + + + 
67 0 + + + 
68 0 + + + 
69 0 + + + 
70 0 + + + 
71 0 + + + 
72 0 + + + 
73 0 + + + 
74 0 + + + 
75 0 + + + 
76 0 + + + 
77 0 + + + 
78 0 + + + 
79 0 + + + 
80 0 + + + 
81 0 + + + 
82 0 + + + 
83 0 + + + 
84 0 + + + 
85 0 + + + 
86 0 - + + 
87 0 + + + 
88 0 + + + 
89 0 + + + 
90 0 + + + 
91 0 + + + 
92 0 + + + 
93 0 + + + 
94 0 + + + 
95 0 + + + 
96 0 + + + 
97 0 + + + 
1 - + + 
0 + + + 
0 - + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 - + + 
0 + + + 
0 - + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
1 + + + 
1 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 - + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 - + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 - + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + - + 
0 + + + 
0 - + - 
0 - - - 
0 - - - 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 - + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 - + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 - + + 
0 - + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
 69
98 0 + + + 
99 0 + + + 
100 0 + + + 
 
0 + + + 
0 - + + 
0 + + + 
 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
 
0 - + + 
0 + + + 
0 + + + 
 
 
 Table 3: Classifications for the 100 test sessions recorded for Clustering Analysis. 
 
 The Relative Operating Characteristic Curve for three clustering techniques and 
the Self-Consistent naïve Bayes technique is given below. The three clustering techniques 
and the Bayesian Network techniques are analyzed on their hit rate and false alarm rates 
produced while detecting masquerades on the 4 user log files. 
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  Figure 19: ROC Curve for the three Clustering, Bayesian Network and  
                   Naïve Bayes Classification techniques. 
 
 Table 4 below is the tabular representation of the Hit Rate and False Alarm Rate 
for the five classification techniques shown in Figure 19. 
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FAR 
                         
                         HR 
 
 
0.25 
0.5 
1 
1.25 
1.75 
3.25 
3.75 
4 
4.5 
5 
8.25 
10.5 
 
LN WM DW BN NB 
24.75 24.75 24.75 24.75 24.75 
24.5 24.5 24.5 49.5 49.5 
24 49 49 49 49 
23.75 48.75 73.75 73.75 73.75 
23.25 73.25 73.25 73.25 73.25 
46.75 71.75 71.75 71.75 71.75 
46.25 71.25 96.25 96.25 71.25 
46.5 71 96 NA 96 
45 95.5 95.5     NA 95.5 
70 95     NA     NA     NA 
66.25      NA     NA     NA     NA 
88.5      NA     NA    NA    NA 
 
  
Table 4: Hit Rates for the five classification techniques and their respective false  
  alarm rates. 
 
  
      In table 4 FAR = False Alarm Rate; HR = Hit Rate; LN = Last n; WM = 
Weighted Means; DW = Decayed Weights; BN = Bayesian Networks; NB = Naïve 
Bayes; NA = Not Applicable. From the above table it is evident that probabilistic analysis 
produced a better result for masquerade detection than clustering analysis on truncated 
commands. Bayesian Networks classifier produced a false alarm rate of 3.75% for a hit 
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rate of 96.25%. This is comparatively better compared to previous techniques in the 
literature but again our analyses were limited to just 4 users and hence our results were 
better. Also the Decayed weight analysis produced a better result than the other two 
sequence rating methods. The false alarm rates produced by decayed weights technique 
for a hit rate of 95.5% was 4.5%. Weighted means produced a false alarm rate of 5% for 
a hit rate of 95%. Last n method had a hit rate of 88.5% for a missing alarm rate of 
10.5%. The remaining 1% in Last n technique was missing alarm.  
 Moreover, our Bayesian networks classifier produced better results than the Naïve 
Bayes classifier. We obtained a hit rate of 95.5% for a false alarm rate of 4.5% for the 
Naïve Bayes classifier for the same analysis for which our Bayesian Networks classifier 
produced a hit rate of 96.25% with a false alarm rate of 3.75%. The Decayed Weight 
clustering analysis on truncated data produced almost identical results as Naïve Bayes 
classifier. Last n sequence rating analysis being very simple produced poor results.   
 We chose an accept threshold value for our clustering technique after a few 
empirical analysis and hence were able to produce slightly poor results for the Decayed 
weight clustering mechanism as compared to the probabilistic analysis. A well chosen 
accept threshold limit may possibly surpass the results of probabilistic analysis. 
   5.3.3 Feasibility of Clustering Analysis. 
 
 
 Training phase of clustering analysis was slow for the training set of 5000 
commands and a sequence length of 10. This was because we had to analyze too many 
overlapped sequences and cluster them. It would be an overwhelming task on real-time if 
we need to cluster huge volume of command line data with a smaller sequence length. 
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One way to speedup clustering analysis is to increase sequence length to a limit that 
would produce better result in less time. We carried out our clustering analysis on a 
sequence length of 10 and the results produced were comparable to probabilistic analysis.  
  In real time one would expect an optimal sequence length Clustering 
algorithm to be implemented based on the volume of data. We can imagine an automated 
algorithm that adjusts its sequence length based on the volume of data to be tested. This 
could cause more work to form new clusters of different length. However this thesis 
considered a user log file of 15000 commands and there weren’t much problems for the 
algorithm running to completion for a sequence length of 10. In reality building small 
command sequences to cluster would cost more time. 
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                                           CHAPTER VI   
                                                           CONCLUSION 
 
 Detecting masquerade using profile creation is just one component of a security 
system that also has other mechanisms to monitor and detect intrusions. These may 
include cameras, keystroke monitors and well-equipped systems for surveillance. The 
proposed command history analysis mechanisms, namely, Bayesian Networks and 
clustering methods further enhance the systems that already exist. Our proposed system 
further improves the security of systems since it is an automated approach. 
 Although over the years different mechanisms have been tried out to train user 
profiles and detect intruders, clustering techniques are still in their infancy. We proposed 
a novel Hybrid Bayesian network for masquerade detection as well as novel clustering 
algorithm for masquerade detection. 
  Results show that the hybrid Bayesian network produces the best results.  
However this was for a limited dataset and with a larger number of dataset or users, the 
clustering approach may produce better results. The simulation work for clustering 
mechanism and Bayesian mechanism was illuminating, especially as an elaborate study 
of three rating mechanisms showed that Decayed weights was better than the other two 
methods since it used the varying alpha parameter. 
  The ROC curve in figure18 shows that probabilistic analysis produced better 
results than clustering analysis. The probabilistic method was simple and produced 
slightly better results than clustering on Schonlau data. The false alarm rate and hit rate 
recorded by these techniques are explained in section 5.3.2.2. As explained before, we 
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analyzed only four users log files and recorded these results. Surprisingly the 
probabilistic analysis that didn’t consider sequence information of sessions produced a 
better result than clustering analysis that considered sequence information in the form of 
LCS. A session can thus be considered as a bag of words in this case and still produces 
better results since we are mainly focusing on the frequency of commands seen in proper 
and masquerade sessions. This clearly explains the success of the Naïve Bayes classifier 
for session classification. Moreover our Bayesian networks classifier being a hybrid 
online-offline technique produced better results than Naïve Bayes classifier. 
   Developing a real-time Intrusion Detection System based on the clustering 
algorithm would require analyzing the data files from the disk rather than trying to 
analyze the data using RAM. This is because the log files are huge and it would take a lot 
of time to form and cluster sequences. A real time online detection with a user keying in 
the data on a system would be challenging and interesting. Only such an analysis would 
fully reveal the comparative accuracy of the clustering and probabilistic analysis for 
detecting masquerades. 
              6.1 Future Work 
 
 
             As we discussed in section 5.3.1.1 probabilistic and clustering analysis on 
enriched data could be promising. Furthermore, tuning the accept threshold value for 
optimal results could also be a promising analysis. This could be separately worked out 
for both the truncated and enriched data. Our limited analysis can be further extended for 
50 users on the Bayesian Networks approach. Since Clustering approach was slow for a 
sequence length of 10 we had to limit our analysis to 4 users. A real time clustering 
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detector would require a better algorithm and sophisticated systems with huge RAM. 
Since we tested our algorithm with a sequence length of 10 we were not able to perform a 
comparative analysis of both the schemes on all 50 users.  
 All the proposed techniques in the literature and in this thesis produce false 
alarms to some extent. The false alarm rate has to be kept low. We can only achieve a 
false alarm rate reduction by proposing new methods. Since Concept drift cannot be 
avoided in real time false alarms will exist. Hence designing a 100% accurate real-time 
Intrusion detection system is impossible. 
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